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We propose efficient-phase-encoding protocols for continuous-variable quantum key distribution
using coherent states and postselection. By these phase encodings, the probability of basis mismatch
is reduced and total efficiency is increased. We also propose mixed-state protocols by omitting a part
of classical communication steps in the efficient-phase-encoding protocols. The omission implies a
reduction of information to an eavesdropper and possibly enhances the security of the protocols.
We investigate the security of the protocols against individual beam splitting attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In quantum key distribution (QKD), two distant parties,
Alice and Bob share a secret key exploiting quantum channel
and classical communication. By the laws of quantum physics
the key can be proved to be secure against an eavesdropper
(Eve) who has advanced technologies [1]. Many novel and
modified QKD protocols have been proposed based on var-
ious theoretical and experimental aspects. For example, in
the standard weak-coherent-state (WCS) implementation of
the BB84 protocol, the transmission distance of QKD is lim-
ited by the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [2]. To de-
feat this limitation, modifications of the implementation have
been proposed. An elegant one is the SARG protocol which
changes the classical communication step in the implementa-
tion [3]. Another one is the decoy-state protocols that utilize
fake signals to restrict possiblility of the PNS attack [4, 5].
A different type of WCS implementation has been proposed
combining the idea of the balanced homodyne detection of an
weak signal field with a strong field in the phase-encoding in-
terferometric implementation of the BB84 protocol [6]. This
proposal also includes the idea of postselection in continuous
variable (CV) QKD. Following BB84, the protocol has inef-
ficiency of basis mismatch associated with the random ba-
sis exchange, the choice of the quadratures. However, there
are several CV QKD protocols that have no such inefficiency
[7, 8, 9, 10]. In relation with the implementation, those pro-
tocols employ the amplitude modulations in addition to the
phase modulation, and the signals are not necessarily WCS.
Although CV QKD protocols are free from the limitation by
the PNS attack, another practical limitation is given by the
classical teleportation attack [11, 12].
In this paper we propose efficient phase-encoding protocols
for CV QKD using balanced homodyne detection and posts-
election those have better efficiency than the original one [6]
without significant changes in experimental setup. We also
propose mixed-state protocols by omitting the part of classi-
cal communication steps.
In Sec. II, we review the original protocol and provide a
basic notation. In Sec. III, we present modified protocols. In
∗Electric address: namiki@qo.phys.gakushuin.ac.jp
Sec. IV, we investigate the security against individual beam
splitting attack. Sec. V is the conclusion and remarks.
II. ORIGINAL FOUR-COHERENT-STATE
POSTSELECTION PROTOCOL
The original four-state postselection protocol (O4) [6, 13]
is based on the phase-encoding interferometric implementa-
tion of QKD and the balanced homodyne detection of a weak
signal field with a strong field as in FIG. 1.
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FIG. 1: The pulse emitted from a light source (LD) is split
into a strong local oscillator (LO) and a weak signal field by
an asymmetric beam splitter (ABS). Alice applies her phase
shift φA to the signal and Bob applies his phase shift φB
to the LO. The signal and LO interfere at the 50:50 beam
splitter (BS). The difference between the photon numbers of
the output pulses of the BS is observed.
Alice sends the coherent state |αeiφA〉 with α > 0 by
randomly choosing her phase modulation φA from a set
{0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. Bob measures the quadratures xˆ(φB) ≡
xˆ1 cosφB+ xˆ2 sinφB by randomly choosing his phase modula-
tion φB from a set {0, pi/2} where xˆ1 ≡ aˆ+aˆ†2 and xˆ2 ≡ aˆ−aˆ
†
2i
.
Bob’s measurement is characterized by the quadrature dis-
tribution of the coherent state |〈xφB |αeiφA〉|2 where 〈xφB | is
the eigenbra of xˆ(φB) with the eigenvalue xφB . For a simpler
notation we define
P (x,α, φ) ≡
√
2
pi
exp
{−2(x− α cosφ)2} . (1)
2Then, we can write
|〈xφB |αeiφA 〉|2 = P (xφB , α, φA − φB). (2)
After the transmission, Bob informs Alice of his phase shift
φB. If |φA − φB| = {0, pi}, Bob’s distribution is one of the
Gaussian distributions centered either at ±α as in FIG. 2. We
call such a combination of (φA, φB) the correct basis and the
quadrature distribution is given by
PB(x, α) =
1
2
(P (x, α, 0) + P (x,α, pi)) , (3)
where x corresponds to Bob’s measurement outcome.
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FIG. 2: The quadrature distributions of correct-basis choice
are shown. The solid curve peaked at x = α corresponds to
the signal of Alice’s bit “1” and the dotted line peaked at
x = −α corresponds to the signal of Alice’s bit “0”.
For the correct-basis case, the signal can transfer bit in-
formation from Alice to Bob by the following manner. Alice
encodes her bit according to the combination of (φA, φB) as in
Table I. Bob decodes the bit value according to his outcome
x: If x ≥ 0 his bit value is “1” otherwise his bit value is “0”.
The bit error rate (BER) conditioned on the absolute value
|x| is given by
qB(x,
√
ηα) =
P (|x|,√ηα, pi)
P (|x|,√ηα, 0) + P (|x|,√ηα, pi) . (4)
where we assume the lossy channel with the line transmission
η, (0 < η ≤ 1). Since the quadrature distributions are spread
and overlapped, Bob’s positive (negative) quadrature result
needs not correspond to Alice’s bit “1” (“0”) and Bob’s de-
coding has inherently finite errors. However, qB is less than
1
2
if x 6= 0 and non-zero information is transferred. By select-
ing the data according to the value of x, Alice and Bob can
discard the erroneous portion. This process is called postse-
lection.
If (|φA−φB| mod pi) = pi/2, the signal is called the wrong
basis. In this case, they cannot share the bit information
because Bob’s quadrature distribution is the same for such
a combination of φA and φB , and the wrong-basis signal is
discarded.
TABLE I: Alice’s bit encoding of the original four-state pro-
tocol
φA 0 0 pi/2 pi/2 pi pi 3pi/2 3pi/2
φB 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2
〈xˆ〉 α 0 0 α −α 0 0 −α
A 1 1 0 0
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FIG. 3: Phase-space picture of the original four-state protocol
We define the efficiency Pe of the protocol as the probability
that the signal becomes correct basis. In this O4 protocol one-
half of signals are discarded and
Pe =
1
2
. (5)
In the modified protocols, this quantity will be improved.
Alice’s bit encoding of the O4 protocol associated with
φA, φB , and Bob’s mean value of quadratures 〈xˆ〉 ≡
〈αeiφA |xˆ(φB)|αeiφA 〉 is summarized in Table I where A rep-
resents Alice’s bit. For the combination of wrong basis, 〈xˆ〉
is zero and A is set to be blank. The probability of wrong
basis is determined by the number of blanks in the row A. A
phase-space description is shown in FIG. 3.
Towards the modification, the essential point of performing
the postselection is that Bob’s distribution takes the form like
FIG. 2. As we will show, the state configuration of FIG.3
and the random choice of a conjugate-quadrature pair is not
necessary.
For a convenience, we set Alice’s bit encoding rule: The
combination of (φA, φB) that leads to 〈xˆ〉 = 0 is for wrong
basis, 〈xˆ〉 = α is for bit “1” and 〈xˆ〉 = −α is for bit “0”.
Note that Table I is consistent with this rule. We use this
rule repeatedly in the following section.
The security of the protocol can be related to the uncer-
tainty relation of the quadratures,
(∆x1)
2(∆x2)
2 ≥ 1
16
. (6)
Let us consider the ideal case, i.e., the channel and detector
are lossless and noiseless. In such a case Bob can measure the
mean and variance of xˆ1 and xˆ2 for each of the four coherent
states and confirm that each of the states is in the minimum
uncertainty state with (∆x1)
2 = (∆x2)
2 = 1
4
. Since such
a minimum uncertainty state is a pure coherent state, this
implies that a set of non-orthogonal states transfers without
any disturbance. Thus, there is no Eve’s intervention if the
variances and mean values of quadratures have no changes,
and the minimum uncertainty ensures the security.
III. EFFICIENT POSTSELECTION
PROTOCOLS
In this section we present several modified protocols.
3A. Three-state protocol
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FIG. 4: Phase-space picture of the three-state protocol
The encoding of the three-state protocol is schematically
described on the phasespace as in FIG. 4 (The “1”s and
“0”s in FIG. 4 represent Alice’s bit encoding associated with
Bob’s basis). Alice sends the coherent state |α′eiφA〉 with
φA = {0, 2pi/3, 4pi/3} and α′ ≡ 2√
3
α. Bob measures xˆ(φB)
with φB = {pi/2,−pi/6,−5pi/6}. We can easily see that if
(|φA − φB| mod pi) is different from pi/2, then the quadra-
ture distribution takes the form of the one in FIG. 2. In such
a condition, we can perform the postselection procedure. If
(|φA − φB| mod pi) = pi/2, the combination of (φA, φB) is
wrong basis and discarded.
Using Alice’s bit encoding rule in Sec. II, we obtain Table
II. From Table II, we can see that the wrong-basis case occurs
with probability 1/3. Thus, the efficiency is
Pe =
2
3
, (7)
which is 4/3 times higher than that of the O4 protocol.
TABLE II: Alice’s bit encoding of the three-state protocol
φA 0 0 0 2pi/3 2pi/3 2pi/3 4pi/3 4pi/3 4pi/3
φB pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6 pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6 pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6
〈xˆ〉 0 α −α α −α 0 −α 0 α
A 1 0 1 0 0 1
This encoding is based on the idea that Alice applies dif-
ferent encoding according to Bob’s choice of basis. In CV
QKD protocols, an efficient encoding where two variables are
encoded on two conjugate quadratures has already been com-
mon. Our proposal can be interpreted as a generalization
of this idea, namely, we encode two values on non-conjugate
quadratures.
As a security aspect of the three-state protocol, it should
be checked whether the minimum uncertainty is confirmed in
the case Bob measures three different quadratures. Suppose
that Bob observes (∆x2)
2 = 1
4
and (∆xφ)
2 = 1
4
. Then, from
the definition of xˆ(φ),
(∆xφ)
2 ≡ 〈(xˆ1 cos φ+ xˆ2 sinφ)2 − 〈xˆ1 cos φ+ xˆ2 sinφ〉2〉
= (∆x1)
2 cos2 φ+ (∆x2)
2 sin2 φ
+(〈xˆ1xˆ2 + xˆ2xˆ1〉 − 2〈xˆ1〉〈xˆ2〉) sin φ cos φ, (8)
TABLE III: Alice’s bit encoding for the efficient four-state
protocols
φA pi/4 pi/4 3pi/4 3pi/4 5pi/4 5pi/4 7pi/4 7pi/4
φB 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2
〈xˆ〉 α α −α α −α −α α −α
A 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
and we obtain(
(∆x1)
2 − 1
4
)
+ (〈xˆ1xˆ2 + xˆ2xˆ1〉 − 2〈xˆ1〉〈xˆ2〉) tanφ = 0. (9)
Since this relation holds for both φ = −pi/6 and φ = −5pi/6
in the three-state protocol, we obtain
(∆x1)
2 =
1
4
. (10)
B. Efficient four-state protocols
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FIG. 5: Phase-space picture of the efficient four-state protocol
The encoding of the efficient four-state (E4) protocol is
schematically described in FIG. 5. Alice sends |α′′eiφA 〉 with
φA = {pi/4, 3pi/4, 5pi/4, 7pi/4} and α′′ ≡
√
2α. Bob mea-
sures xˆ(φB) with φB = {0, pi/2}. After the transmission (i)
Bob informs Alice of his phase. Then, (ii) Alice tells Bob
that her preparation of the states belongs to which one of
the four sets {|α′′eipi/4〉, |α′′e3ipi/4〉}, {|α′′e3ipi/4〉, |α′′ei5pi/4〉},
{|α′′e5ipi/4〉, |α′′e7ipi/4〉}, and {|α′′e7ipi/4〉, |α′′eipi/4〉} accord-
ing to Bob’s choice of the phase. Namely, if φB = 0, Alice tells
Bob that the state belong to either {|α′′eipi/4〉, |α′′e3ipi/4〉}
or {|α′′e5ipi/4〉, |α′′e7ipi/4〉}. If φB = pi/2, Alice tells Bob
that the state belong to either {|α′′e3ipi/4〉, |α′′ei5pi/4〉} or
{|α′′e7ipi/4〉, |α′′eipi/4〉}.
In every case, the state takes the form similar to the one
in FIG. 2 and we can perform the postselection procedure.
Thus, the efficiency is
Pe = 1. (11)
This is also clear from the configuration of the states in FIG.
5. Applying Alice’s bit encoding rule we obtain Table III.
Now we present another four-state protocol by modifying
the classical communication step of the E4 protocol. Let us
4assume that Alice omits the announcement (ii), then the pro-
tocol still works without any further modification and the
information that Alice and Bob share does not change. This
is because Bob’s distribution and bit decoding do not depend
on the announcement (ii). The information is encoded on the
pairs of the states, and it is not necessary to identify the states
in each pair. Therefore, the redundant state information need
not be announced.
This modification possibly enhances the security because
Eve cannot exploit the classical information (ii). The loss of
the information can be described by using the terms of mixed
states. From Eve’s point of view, Alice’s preparation of states
is not in a set of pure coherent states but in a set of mixtures
of coherent states. We call this modified protocol the mixed
state protocol based on the four states (MB4).
We have seen that the postselection protocol can be demon-
strated without wrong-basis signal as in other CV QKD pro-
tocols. Conversely, if there are wrong-basis signals in a phase
encoding CV QKD as in the O4 protocol, the signals are
supposed to have some useful information and may play a
role of the decoy states. Namely, the wrong-basis signals re-
strict Eve’s possible operations. Such aspect has already been
pointed out in Refs. [6, 13].
C. Six-state protocols
In a similar manner to the E4 and MB4 protocols, we can
find a six-state protocol and its mixed-state version.
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FIG. 6: Phase-space picture of the six-state protocol
The encoding of the six-state protocols can be schemati-
cally described on the phasespace as in FIG. 6. Alice sends
|α′eiφA〉 with φA = mpi/3, m = {0, 1, 2, · · · , 5}. Bob mea-
sures xˆ(φB) with φB = {pi/2,−pi/6,−5pi/6}. The configura-
tion of the six-state protocol in FIG. 6 has a similar symmetry
to that of the three-state protocol in FIG. 4. If we make a
mirror reflection of the three states associated with any one
of the measured axes on the phasespace, we can obtain the
six-state configuration.
From Fig. 6, we can see that if (|φA − φB | mod pi) is
different from pi/2, the quadrature distribution takes the form
similar to the one in Fig. 2. In such a condition, we can
perform the postselection procedure. The other cases, i.e.,
(|φA − φB| mod pi) = pi/2, are for wrong-basis result.
Using the bit encoding rule, we can obtain Table IV. From
Table IV, we can see that the efficiency is
Pe =
2
3
, (12)
which is equivalent to that of the three-state protocol.
TABLE IV: Alice’s bit encoding of the six-state protocols
φA 0 0 0 pi/3 pi/3 pi/3 2pi/3 2pi/3 2pi/3 pi pi pi 4pi/3 4pi/3 4pi/3 5pi/3 5pi/3 5pi/3
φB pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6 pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6 pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6 pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6 pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6 pi/2 −pi/6 −5pi/6
〈xˆ〉 0 α −α α 0 −α α −α 0 0 −α α −α 0 α −α α 0
A 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
The classical communication step in the six-state protocol
is as follows: (i) Bob informs Alice of his phase φB and then
(ii) Alice tells Bob that her preparation of the states is wrong
basis or belongs to either two-state subset in the one of the
three sets{
{|α′eipi/3〉, |α′e5ipi/3〉}, {|α′e2ipi/3〉, |α′e4ipi/3〉}
}
, (13){
{|α′〉, |α′e2ipi/3〉}, {|α′eipi〉, |α′e5ipi/3〉}
}
, (14)
and {
{|α′eipi/3〉, |α′eipi〉}, {|α′〉, |α′e4ipi/3〉}
}
, (15)
5according to the value of φB = pi/2,−pi/6, and −5pi/6 , re-
spectively.
Let us modify the step (ii) as (ii)′ Alice tells Bob that her
preparation of the states is wrong basis or not. Then, the
protocol still works and the performance is essentially the
same. This provides the mixed state protocol based on the six
states (MB6). In this protocol, Alice’s preparation of states
is considered to be one of the equal-probability mixtures of
the states in one of the subsets.
Note that all above protocols can be performed essentially
in the same experimental setup based on the interferometer
because the modifications are given in the way of phase mod-
ulation and classical communication steps.
D. Eight-state protocols
We describe an eight-state protocol and its mixed-state ver-
sion. Different from the previous ones, this protocol requires
not only the phase modulation, but also the amplitude mod-
ulation in the interferometric implementation.
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FIG. 7: Phase-space picture of the eight-state protocol
The encoding of the eight-state protocols can be schemat-
ically described on the phasespace as in FIG. 7. Alice sends
coherent state {|αeim2 pi〉, |α′′ei 2m
′+1
4
pi〉} by choosing φA =
mpi/2,m = {0, 1, 2, 3} with α and φA = (2m′ + 1)pi/4, m′ =
{0, 1, 2, 3} with α′′ = √2α. Bob chooses his phase φB =
{0, pi/2}.
From FIG. 7, we can see that if (|φA − φB| mod pi) is
different from pi/2, the quadrature distribution takes the form
similar to the one in FIG. 2. In such a condition, we can
perform the postselection procedure. The other cases, i.e.,
(|φA − φB| mod pi) = pi/2, are for wrong-basis result. Using
the bit encoding rule, we can obtain Table V. From Table V,
we can see that the efficiency is
Pe =
3
4
(16)
which is higher than that of the O4 protocol by the factor of
3/2.
TABLE V: Alice’s bit encoding of the eight-state protocol
φA 0 0 pi/4 pi/4 pi/2 pi/2 3pi/4 3pi/4 pi pi 5pi/4 5pi/4 3pi/2 3pi/2 7pi/4 7pi/4
φB 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2 0 pi/2
〈xˆ〉 α 0 α α 0 α −α α α −α 0 −α −α 0 α −α
A 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
In the classical communication step, (i) Bob informs Alice
of his phase φB and then (ii) Alice tells Bob that her prepa-
ration of the states is wrong basis or belongs to which one of
the two-state subsets in the two sets
{
{|α〉, |αeipi〉}, {|α′′eipi/4〉, |α′′e3ipi/4〉}, {|α′′e5ipi/4〉, |α′′e7ipi/4〉}
}
, (17)
and {
{|αeipi/2〉, |αe3ipi/2〉}, {|α′′eipi/4〉, |α′′e7ipi/4〉}, {|α′′e3ipi/4〉, |α′′e5ipi/4〉}
}
, (18)
according to the value of φB = 0, and pi/2 , respectively. Let us modify the process (ii) as (ii)
′ Alice tells Bob that
6her preparation of the states is wrong basis or not. Then,
still the protocol works and the performance is essentially the
same. In this case, Alice’s preparation of states is considered
to be a three-state equal-probability mixture. We call this
modified eight-state protocol the mixed state protocol based
on the eight states (MB8). The MB8 protocol is considered to
be a mixture of the O4 and E4 protocols with certain changes
in the classical communication step. Thus, it is possible to
switch the protocols by changing the classical communication
after the transmission.
E. Generalization of protocols
We present a generalized mixed-state protocol which in-
cludes the MB4 and MB8 protocols. This generalization may
not have practical utility but it is useful for the discussion of
the security (see Sec. IV).
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FIG. 8: Phase-space picture of the 4n+ 4-state protocol
The encoding of the generalized protocol can be schemat-
ically described on the phasespace as in FIG. 8. Alice ran-
domly sends one of the 4n + 4 states, |α(±1 + i( 2k
n+1
− 1))〉,
|α(±i + ( 2m
n+1
− 1))〉, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · , n + 1, m = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Bob measures one of the quadratures, xˆ1 or xˆ2.
Alice encodes bit “1” for |α(1 + i( 2k
n+1
− 1))〉 and “0” for
|α(−1+ i( 2k
n+1
− 1))〉 in the case that Bob measures xˆ1. Alice
encodes bit “1” for |α(i + ( 2k
n+1
− 1))〉 and “0” for |α(−i +
( 2k
n+1
−1))〉 in the case that Bob measures xˆ2. The other cases
are discarded. In this protocol, Alice’s preparation of states
is considered to be a n + 2-state equal-probability mixture.
We can see that n = 0 corresponds to the MB4 protocol and
n = 1 correspond to the MB8 protocol. The efficiency is given
by
Pe =
2 + n
2 + 2n
. (19)
IV. SECURITY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL BEAM
SPLITTING ATTACK
A. Individual beam splitting attack
The safety of the QKD protocols under lossy channel is
estimated by assuming the beam splitting attack where Eve
replaces the lossy channel with lossless one and splits the por-
tion of signal corresponds to the loss. Here we consider the
individual beam splitting attack where Eve stores the portion
for arbitrarily long time with a perfect quantum memory and
she performs her measurement on individual signal indepen-
dently after she learns Bob’s basis of each signal.
In the present protocols, Alice’s preparation of states is
represented by the form of the coherent-state mixture
ρˆ(pi, αi) =
∑
i
pi|αi〉〈αi| (20)
The states of Bob and Eve under the beam splitting attack are
given by ρˆ(pi,
√
ηαi) and ρˆ(pi,
√
1− ηαi) respectively, where
η is the line transmission (0 < η ≤ 1).
B. Eve’s knowledge
Let us assume the situation that Eve receives one of the
binary states ρˆ± whose subscript corresponds to Alice’s bit
encoding and each of them appears with the equal probabil-
ity, 1
2
. An upperbound of Eve’s knowledge represented by the
fraction of the bit sequence deleted in the privacy amplifica-
tion [14, 15, 16] is given by
τu = log2(2− |〈ψ+|ψ−〉|2), (21)
where |ψ±〉 is a purification of ρˆ±. This formula is origi-
nally given for the pure-state signal [17]. For the case of the
mixed-state signal, by assuming Eve obtains a purification
that always includes the original mixed-state signal, we can
safely estimate an upperbound. A tight estimation of the
inner product is directly calculated by the fidelity [18]
F (ρˆ+, ρˆ−) = max|ψ±〉
|〈ψ+|ψ−〉| = Tr
√√
ρˆ+ρˆ−
√
ρˆ+ (22)
where the maximization is taken over all the purifications.
In the following we determine Eve’s states under the beam
splitting attack for each of the protocols and estimate the
inner product |〈ψ+|ψ−〉|. It is shown that all of them have
the same bound of the inner product |〈ψ+|ψ−〉| = e−2(1−η)α2 ,
which gives the same upperbound of Eve’s knowledge.
For the three-state protocol, Eve’s states are given by
ρˆ± = |
√
1− ηα′e± 23pi〉〈
√
1− ηα′e± 23pi| (23)
assuming that Bob set φB = pi/2. Then, taking |ψ±〉 =
|√1− ηα′e± 23pi〉, we obtain |〈ψ+|ψ−〉| = e−2(1−η)α2 . The
same bound can be applied for φB = −pi/6 and φB = −5pi/6
because in that case ρˆ± can be obtained from those in Eq.
(23) with proper rotations in the phasespace. Similarly we
omit the discussions of phase-covariant cases in the follow-
ings. Since the configuration of the six-state protocols can be
obtained from that of the three-state protocol by the mirror
reflection. The same bound can be applied to the pure version
of the six-state protocols.
For the E4 protocol, Eve’s states are given by
ρˆ± = |
√
1− η(1± i)α〉〈
√
1− η(1± i)α| (24)
assuming that Bob set φB = pi/2 and Alice announced her
preparation was in the pair |(1 ± i)α〉. Then, taking |ψ±〉 =
|(1± i)α〉 we obtain the same bound, |〈ψ+|ψ−〉| = e−2(1−η)α2 .
For the MB4 protocol, Eve’s states are given by
ρˆ± =
1
2
(
| ±
√
1− η(1 + i)α〉〈±
√
1− η(1 + i)α|
+| ±
√
1− η(1− i)α〉〈±
√
1− η(1− i)α|
)
(25)
7assuming that Bob set φB = 0. Using the formula of
the fidelity in Appendix A, we obtain the estimation F =
e−2(1−η)α
2
. Since Eve’s states of the pure version of the eight-
state protocols is that of either the O4 protocol or the E4 pro-
tocol. Therefore, the pure version of the eight-state protocols
also has the same bound.
For the MB6 protocol, Eve’s states are given by
ρˆ± =
1
2
(
|
√
1− ηα′e±pi3 〉〈
√
1− ηα′e±pi3 |
+|
√
1− ηα′e± 23pi〉〈
√
1− ηα′e± 23pi|
)
(26)
assuming that Bob set φB = pi/2. Then, using the formula
of the fidelity in Appendix A again, we obtain the estimation
F = e−2(1−η)α
2
.
For the generalized protocol including the MB4 and MB8
protocol, Eve’s states are given by
ρˆ± ≡ 1
n+ 2
n+1∑
k=0
|β±(n, k)〉〈β±(n, k)|, (27)
β±(n, k) ≡
√
1− ηα
{
±1 + i
(
2k − n− 1
n+ 1
)}
, (28)
assuming Bob set φB = 0. We can see that the following
states are purifications of ρˆ±,
|ψ±〉 ≡ 1√
n+ 2
n+1∑
k=0
|β±(n, k)〉|k〉e±iω(k), (29)
ω(k) ≡ (1− η)α2
(
2k − n− 1
n+ 1
)
, (30)
where {|k〉} is an orthonormal basis set of an extended space.
The bound is given by
|〈ψ+|ψ−〉| = e−2(1−η)α
2
(31)
independent of n.
The purification |ψ±〉 of Eq. (29) implies that Eve knows
the extra-state information k which is never announced in the
mixed-state protocols. Given this information Eve’s problem
is just to distinguish the two pure states |β±(n, k)〉. Thus, the
bound is equal to that of the pure-state case. In this sense,
the information from the mixed-state signal is upper bounded
by that of the pure-state case and the omission of the classi-
cal communication possibly reduces Eve’s information. This
fact suggests that mixed-state protocols are advantageous.
However, optimization problems for mixed-state signals are
technically difficult compared with those for pure-state cases
in general. For the pure-state protocols, the upperbound is
achievable by the optimal measurement which minimizes the
error rate. On the other hand, it is not sure that the up-
perbound can be tight for the mixed-state protocols. If the
bound is not tight, it implies that the mixed-state protocol is
more secure.
C. Formula of secure key gain
The secure key gain [14, 15, 16] as a estimation of QKD
performance against individual BS attack for the present pro-
tocols is given by
G(α, η, x0) = Pe
(∑
x
PB(x,
√
ηα)i(qB(|x|,√ηα))− τu
)
.(32)
where
i(q) ≡ 1 + q log2 q + (1− q) log2(1− q) (33)
is the mutual information of the binary symmetric channel,
and τu = log2(2− e−4(1−η)α
2
) is given from the previous sub-
section. Since the correct-basis distributions, the BER, and
τ are the same as those of the O4 protocol, the value of the
gain is the same as that of the O4 protocol [11] except for the
factor Pe.
In the presence of noise, the estimation of the gain is in
progress. As long as we use the coherent states and homodyne
detection the limitation of all the protocols can be found [11,
12].
V. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS
We have proposed several phase-encoding protocols for
quantum key distribution using coherent states and postse-
lection. The modified phase encodings reduce the probability
of wrong basis and increase the efficiency. The proposed pro-
tocols include the mixed-state protocols, those are obtained
from the protocols exploiting more than three states by omit-
ting the annoucement of the redundant state information in
the classical communication steps.
We have investigated the security of the protocols against
the individual beam splitting attack. We showed that the
improvement of the key gains is simply proportional to the
efficiency and no substantial difference is observed whether
the protocol is mixed-state version or not. This result is de-
pending on the way of our analysis and it leaves an open
question whether the modified protocols provide physically
different condition in the security of QKD particularly on the
relation with the introduction of the mixed states.
There exist several possibilities to make other protocols.
Trivial one is to increase the way of phase modulations. To use
asymmetric configuration or biased choice of basis [19] may be
interesting. Extensive search of protocols and optimization of
efficiencies are left for future works.
APPENDIX A: FIDELITY BETWEEN THE
MIXTURES OF TWO COHERENT STATES
We derive a formula of the fidelity between the mixtures of
two coherent states
ρˆ =
1
2
(|α〉〈α|+ |β〉〈β|) (A1)
σˆ =
1
2
(| − α〉〈−α|+ | − β〉〈−β|) (A2)
with α = a+ ib, β = a− ib, (a, b ≥ 0). A phase-space config-
uration of the states is shown in FIG. 9. Since we can write
√
ρˆ =
1√
2
(√
1 + γ|+〉〈+|+
√
1− γ|−〉〈−|
)
(A3)
where we defined an orthonormal basis which diagonalizes ρˆ
|±〉 ≡ |α〉 ± e
iφ|β〉√
2(1± γ) (A4)
γeiφ ≡ 〈β|α〉, γ ≥ 0, (A5)
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FIG. 9: Phase-space picture of the mixtures of two coherent
states
we can find a matrix representation of
√
ρˆσˆ
√
ρˆ as(
〈+|
〈−|
)√
ρˆσˆ
√
ρˆ
(
|+〉 |−〉
)
≡ 1
4
(
(1 + γ)〈+|σˆ|+〉
√
1− γ2〈+|σˆ|−〉√
1− γ2〈−|σˆ|+〉 (1− γ)〈−|σˆ|−〉
)
=
e−4a
2
4
(
1 + e−4b
2
+ 2e−2b
2
cos(4ab) −2ie−2b2 sin(4ab)
2ie−2b
2
sin(4ab) 1 + e−4b
2 − 2e−2b2 cos(4ab)
)
. (A6)
Then, using the relation Tr
√
X =
√
TrX + 2
√
detX for a 2×2 positive matrix X, we obtain the fidelity
F (ρˆ, σˆ) ≡ Tr
√√
ρˆσˆ
√
ρˆ =
√
Tr(
√
ρˆσˆ
√
ρˆ) + 2
√
det(
√
ρˆσˆ
√
ρˆ) = e−2a
2
. (A7)
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